

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/26 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000608460001-2

*file copy
sound*

DATE 1/2/86

DOC NO NESAM 85-10239

OCR CYS 3

P&PD CY 1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/26 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000608460001-2

07p

25X1

SUBJECT: Breaking With Moscow: A Viable Military Option for India

Internal Distribution

- 1 - DDI
- 1 - NIO/NESA
- 1 - D/NESA
- 1 - DD/NESA
- 1 - C/PPS
- 1 - C/SO/D/NESA
- 1 - C/SO/S/NESA
- 1 - D/SOVA
- 1 - C/SOV/RIG
- 1 - D/OGI
- 1 - C/ISID/OGI
- 1 - CPAS/ISS
- 1 - **CPAS/IMD/CB**
- 1 - NESA/PS
- 1 - NESA/SO/S

External Distribution:

Ms. Sandra Charles
Director, Near East South Asia Region, International Security Affairs
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301

Captain Edward Louis Christiansen, USN
Chief, South Asian Regional Plans and Policy Branch
Department of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301

Dr. Stephen Cohen
Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State, Room 7311, Washington, DC 20520

Mr. H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Political Military Affairs
Department of State, Room 7327, Washington, DC 20520

Mr. John Lenczowski
Director, European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council
Room 368, Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20520

Mr. Ron Lorton
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, South Asia Division,
Department of State, Room 4636A, Washington, DC 20520

25X1

25X1

Mr. Michael MacMurray
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301

Mr. Marc Palovitz
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs,
Near Eastern-South Asian Region, Department of Defense
Room 4d765, Pentagon, Washington, DC

Mr. Mark Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs,
Department of State, Room 4217, Washington, DC 20520

Mr. Christopher Ross
Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State, Room 5254A, Washington, DC 20520

Dr. Michael Pillsbury
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Policy Planning),
Department of Defense, Room 4B947, Pentagon Washington, DC 20301

Mr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense, Room 4D840, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301

25X1

25X1

26 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Addressees
FROM: DI/NESA/SO/S
SUBJECT: Breaking With Moscow: A Viable Military Option For India

1. The attached typescript examines how India would cope with the practical problems of a cutoff of Soviet military assistance. It concludes that the Indians could maintain a viable defense vis-a-vis Pakistan and manage their readiness and operational problems while moving toward an arsenal based heavily on Western military equipment. We have based this judgment on the experiences of other Third World countries--Egypt, Iraq, and Somalia--that have suffered from Soviet cutoffs, factoring in what we believe to be India's greater defense industrial and general military capabilities. []

25X1

2. The typescript does not predict how such an cutoff could occur, whether it would be initiated by New Delhi or Moscow, or what would be the larger political and economic ramifications. We doubt that such a cutoff is likely, given Rajiv Gandhi's determination to maintain India's strategic relationship with the USSR while improve ties to the United States. Nor do we have any evidence to suggest that either India or the USSR is considering such a step. []

25X1

3. We do, nevertheless, believe there are a number of new and dynamic elements in the Indo-Soviet relationship that argue for a more speculative look at it. Both New Delhi and Moscow are looking for greater room to maneuver in their relations with Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad. Both also have relatively new leaders with limited experience and new domestic and foreign policy agendas. Indian policymakers also are grappling with the possibility of a nascent nuclear arms race that could produce a strategic reassessment of Indian relations with Pakistan, the United States, and the USSR. []

25X1

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

26 December 1985

Breaking With Moscow: A Viable Military Option For India?

25X1

Summary

India's military forces would retain military superiority over Pakistan even after a cutoff of Soviet military assistance in the near future. We believe that although overall readiness would decline as spare parts inventories were consumed and training exercises curtailed, Indian military forces would also be able to maintain an effective defense against Chinese incursions in the north. In our judgment, the impact of a Soviet cutoff on India would be less severe than it was on Egypt in 1974-75 because India has a sizeable nucleus of Western arms, experience with Western logistics and training systems, defense industries capable of producing a wide range of subsystems and spare parts, and a large, unused stockpile of Soviet arms. New Delhi could cope in the short term by turning to other producers of Soviet-model equipment and substituting Western spare parts. We believe the Indian economy could sustain a large scale program of Western military purchases only with a substantial amount of help from the West.

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by Office of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Information available as of 26 December 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Subcontinent, South Asia, NESA,

25X1

25X1

NESA M 85-10239

25X1



25X1

25X1

Effects of a Cutoff

A total cutoff of military assistance by the Soviet Union in the near term would quickly produce a decline in the operational readiness of India's Soviet-built equipment, which includes 70 percent of India's combat aircraft, all of its modern fixed wing and helicopter transport aircraft, almost 50 percent of its tanks, all of its armored personnel carriers, and 80 percent of its naval combatants. [redacted] spare parts stockpiles for aircraft are already below what the Indians consider to be acceptable levels. [redacted]

25X1

25X1
25X1

The withdrawal of the estimated 500 Soviet military technicians in India would complicate Indian efforts to keep its Soviet arsenal fully operational. Most of these technicians are involved in various defense coproduction projects, but many also perform repairs or modifications on Soviet-made equipment. [redacted]

25X1

We would expect, based on Egypt's experience in 1975, a general 30 percent decline in operational readiness of the Indian inventory within 12 months. The Air Force would be hit hardest with aircraft avionics and engines becoming nonoperational within a matter of months, along with radars and other electronic equipment. [redacted] the Indian Air Force has a very difficult time keeping these systems operating under normal conditions. All MiG aircraft engines are still sent to the USSR for overhaul. The readiness of India's naval vessels, particularly its Foxtrot submarines, which regularly suffer from breakdowns of key propulsion and sensor systems, would decline over a slightly longer period of time. In our judgment, India would be able to keep a high percentage of its armored vehicles and artillery pieces in service for a year or longer. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Coping

We believe the Indians would take several steps to keep their Soviet equipment functioning. They would immediately curtail training and normal peace-time operations, accepting a reduction in operator proficiency. They would also step up the production of MiG-21 spare parts, which they produce under license. In one to two years they might be able to produce a modest volume of spares for MiG-27 ground attack aircraft, T-72 tanks and BMP-2 armored vehicles, which are just starting to be assembled in India. The Indians would not be able to build and maintain these vehicles completely on their own for several years. Reverse engineering of major subassemblies they import from the USSR would probably take several years and cost tens of millions of dollars. [redacted]

25X1

The Indians could purchase many subsystems and spare parts for their Soviet equipment from foreign sources. North Korea, Yugoslavia, and Egypt coproduce a wide variety of Soviet weapons now in the Indian inventory--SA-2 and SA-7 SAMs, T-72 tanks, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, MiG-21 fighters, and AT-3 antitank guided missiles--and all three countries have sold weapons and munitions both openly and covertly to countries embargoed by the USSR. Many Soviet weapons and spares are also widely available from private arms brokers who secure them from Poland, East

25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Germany, and Czechoslovakia, although a determined Soviet effort to restrict the flow of military materiel from these countries to India would constrict New Delhi's access. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

Western arms producers would be another logical source for Soviet spare parts and modifications. Over the last 10 years, many Western arms manufacturers have helped India and other Third World countries maintain and upgrade their Soviet model equipment. New Delhi already has put French air-to-air missiles and Western fuel pumps on MiG-21s, British-designed guns on T-55 tanks, and US navigation systems on AN-32 aircraft. With additional Western assistance, it could re-engine T-72 tanks, modernize SA-6 SAMs, and upgrade the avionics on many of its combat aircraft. We estimate that each of these programs would take two to three years to get underway.

[redacted] 25X1

If the Indians anticipated a long term cutoff, they would increase the number of Western-made weapons now in their inventory and step up indigenous development and production of weapons designed with Western assistance. Several of these programs are already underway--the Air Force's Light Combat Aircraft and Light Helicopter and the Army's Arjun Main Battle Tank are being developed, in large part by West German firms, and British firms are involved in the design and construction of surface warships. These programs could be accelerated, perhaps dramatically, by using a larger share of foreign components instead of waiting for Indian defense industries to develop them. Alternatively, the Indians could switch to licensed production of a fully developed Western system to reduce their development costs. For example, they could choose a Western aircraft such as the US F-20, French Rafale, or Swedish Gripen fighter to fulfill the Light Combat Aircraft requirement instead of developing the aircraft themselves. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

New Western systems would require new training and logistics systems. India already has some familiarity with Western maintenance and training programs, but these would have to be expanded dramatically. In the short term this would complicate the already complex logistics system India maintains because of its mixed Soviet and Western inventory. [redacted]

25X1

We believe that over the long haul New Delhi would probably end its policy of not engaging in joint maneuvers or training exercises with foreign militaries. India has maintained this policy with respect to both the Soviet Union and the West in order to demonstrate military self-sufficiency and political nonalignment. After breaking with the Soviets, we believe New Delhi would agree to joint training exercises with Western powers as many other nonaligned states have done. This would expose the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force to new tactics, logistics, and maintenance procedures which arguably would do more to increase their war fighting capabilities than significant new arms purchases. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] 25X1

25X1

Economic Costs

We estimate that it would cost the Indians at least \$15 billion--equivalent to their current annual import bill--to replace the major Soviet weapons systems in their arsenal with comparable Western armaments. The Indians could reduce these costs if they sold off the Soviet equipment now in their inventory, obtained concessional financing, coproduced new Western arms, and replaced older equipment on a less than one-for-one basis. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Indian economy could not sustain a large scale program of Western arms purchases, in our judgment, unless they received a substantial amount of help from the West and spread the rearmament costs over a period of at least 20 years. In the case of a Soviet cutoff, India probably would try to redirect the nearly \$500 million worth of goods and services now paid annually to the USSR for military imports, but many of these goods and services would not be competitive on world markets. If exports could not be expanded significantly, Gandhi's economic modernization program--which we believe may already be creating balance of payments problems for India--would have to be scaled back. Such cuts could probably be reduced by increased access to Western funds. [REDACTED]

25X1

Strategies

We believe India would still be able to deter and successfully defend against an attack by Pakistan. India would maintain a numerical superiority in fighter aircraft, tanks, and warships by virtue of its diversified inventory of Soviet, Western, and indigenously produced weapons (table). It would probably try to maintain current force ratios along the border by drawing on units now deployed in the east and north. This would not severely affect the balance with China which is already in India's favor along their common border, but it probably would set back counterinsurgency operations in the northeast. [REDACTED]

25X1

New Delhi, however, would have to change its current forward defense strategy, which is predicated on mounting strong preemptive and counter offensives directed at Pakistan's armored forces and relying on attrition for success. Shortages of spare parts and munitions would doom such operations from the outset. We suspect that the 70-80 Indian advisers in Iraq are aware of the difficulties experienced by Iraqi forces invading Iran in 1980-81 when the Soviet Union suspended direct arms deliveries. We believe India would switch to counter offensives aimed primarily at the weaker links in Pakistan's defenses, particularly the exposed logistics lines in the Sind. Such a strategy would entail fewer logistical problems and could make greater use of maneuver. [REDACTED]

25X1

Timing

In our judgment, India will not necessarily be any better prepared to deal with a Soviet cutoff in five years than it is today. The advanced Soviet weapons--including MiG-29 fighters, Mi-26 helicopters, Koni class frigates, Kilo class submarines, Tarantul

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

missile corvettes, TU-142F ASW patrol aircraft, and IL-76 AWACS--that New Delhi plans to acquire will increase India's vulnerability to a cutoff. These weapons are more complex and are in fewer inventories around the world, limiting the amount of potential assistance available from foreign militaries and defense industries. Indian forces will also be less familiar with the operation and maintenance of these systems than they are with their current Soviet weapons, making them more dependent on Soviet advisers and technicians. [redacted]

25X1

We believe India's preparedness for such a cutoff will only be improved modestly over the next few years by the delivery of Western equipment now on order or soon to be purchased. By the end of the decade, India probably will have an embryonic collection of new Western attack helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, light tanks, and minesweepers, in addition to towed and self-propelled artillery, diesel submarines, Mirage 2000 and Harrier fighters, and maritime patrol aircraft. [redacted]

25X1

Rajiv Gandhi's search for Western arms, however, is aimed more at acquiring defense production technology for future weapons systems which would not necessarily help India cope with the immediate effects of a Soviet cutoff. Moreover, some programs utilizing this technology--such as the Light Combat Aircraft--will still be several years from entering production at the end of the decade. Existing programs, such as the Arjun main battle tank, could better replace Soviet equipment, but there is no guarantee that they will do better than many other indigenous weapons development programs that have failed over the last decade because of design and funding problems. [redacted]

25X1


25X1




25X1

**ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF A SOVIET CUTOFF
ON INDIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT**

Weapon System	Soviet Operational Inventory	Assumed 30% Decline From Cutoff	Non-Soviet Operational Inventory	Total
Combat Aircraft	195	137	123	260
Tanks	815	571	750	1321
Major Warships	34	24	9	33



25X1



25X1